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The  Nixon  round  of trade  negotiations  opened  in  Tokyo  on
September  12,  1973  amidst  uncertainty  and  hopeful  expectation.
World  leaders  once  again began  the  search  for cost-cutting  ways
to  expand  the  interchange  of world  goods  and increase  the  gross
international product (GIP). The most unusual aspect of this latest
round  of negotiations  was  the  cloudy  atmosphere  surrounding
agricultural  trade.  It was  not entirely  clear  from the opening  ses-
sions  whether  negotiations  would  deal  with  ways  of  lowering
agricultural  import  barriers  or concentrate  on  ways  of removing
food export controls.
The  American  delegation,  led  by  Treasury  Secretary  George
Shultz, reassured the 600 delegates that despite the recent embargo
on  soybean  exports,  the  United  States  does  intend  to  share  its
grain  and  oilseed  crops  with  other  nations.  But  Shultz  did  not
stress  long-held  goals  of lower  world  trade  barriers.  Instead,  he
spoke  of  allocation  problems  arising  from  short  food  supplies.
"The current  shortages  in agricultural  supplies and the danger that
it  will  be  repeated  in  the  future,"  Shultz  suggested,  "give  great
urgency  to the  need  to  find  a more  rational  pattern of production
and trade  in agricultural commodities."  It was an unusual  opening
statement  and  reflected  the  astonishing  turnaround  of  world
agricultural  trade  conditions  of the last  twelve  months.
Negotiating  changes  in  trade  policies  that  have  existed  for
decades  is  never  an  easy  task.  It  is  especially  difficult  when  the
whole  structure  of  income  and  employment  in  the  countries
involved  have adjusted  to these  policies.  Sharp  and rapid changes
in  the  rules  under  which  international  trade  and  investment  are
conducted could  alter,  even interrupt,  the  flow of goods and capi-
tal. Such interruptions  (as we have seen  in  1973)  have international
repercussions  even  when  they  result  from  changes  in  the  market
place.
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changed  by  man-made  negotiations.  This  reality means  that  trade
negotiations  will  move  forward  cautiously.  Many  believe  that  at
least  two  years  will  be  necessary  before  new  agreements  can  be
reached.  In  the case  of agricultural  trade,  a two-year  lag  may  be
especially  appropriate.  It could  allow  adequate  time  for the  new
and  vastly  different  structure  of  farm  prices  and  incomes  to
stabilize.  The  present  uncertain  agricultural  outlook  makes  an
unstable foundation on which to negotiate new trade relationships.
ISSUES  AFFECTING  AGRICULTURAL  TRADE
In  an uncertain  world,  U.S.  agricultural  exports  have  always
contained  an  element  of uncertainty.  In  1973-74,  however,  there
is  an  added  anxiety;  it  is  the  outlook  for  world  food  balances.
The  worldwide  balance  between  future  supply,  future  demand,
and  future  stocks  of grain  commodities  will  play  a  major  role  in
trade.  These  balances  will  determine  future  levels  of trade  and
levels of trade  barriers-not  to mention  levels of grain prices  and
grower incomes. Nothing removes trade barriers more rapidly than
shortages  of food.  Two  recent events  prove this  point:  the reduc-
tion  to  zero  of the  EEC  variable  import  levy  for grains  and  the
relaxation  of U.S.  import  restraints  on  meat  and dairy  products.
Chronically food-short  nations  are  particularly  affected  by  the
present  food outlook.  But  even  some U.S.  consumers  have faced
shortages  of certain  kinds  of food.  Low-income  families  in  this
country  may  have  actually  reduced  total  food  consumption  this
past  year  as  food  prices  increased  sharply.  The  causes  for  the
price rises are complex.  One big factor was rising incomes  in other
nations.  Consumers from other countries could  afford  to bid food
away  from  American  consumers.  Our  low-income  consumers
could  not  compete;  they  did  not  have  the  purchasing  power.
Moreover,  even high-income consumers were  in a weak bargaining
position  because  of price  control programs.
Per  capita  food  consumption  is  declining  in  spite  of the  fact
that U.S. domestic  food  distribution  programs  have expanded.  In
1973  the  government  provided  about  $3.9  billion  of purchasing
power through  food  stamps and other programs.  For the  first time
in  modem times,  outlays for domestic  food distribution  programs
will exceed outlays  for supply  control programs.
There  are  unanswered  questions  concerning  the  future,  how-
ever.  Will  American  consumers  have  to  continue  bidding  food
supplies  away  from other  nations'  consumers?  Or will  American
taxpayers  have  to  return  to  subsidizing  farm  exports.  As  long  as
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certain.
While there was widespread belief earlier that the United States
had considerable  excess  capacity  to produce  crops,  the record  for
1973  is  not  very  reassuring.  We  have  returned  43  million  acres
of set-aside  land  to production-with  a consequent  increase  of 25
million  acres  of  harvested  crop  acres.  Despite  this  10  percent
increase,  total crop production is expected  to rise only  6.2 percent
in  1973.  Total  farm  production,  including  livestock  products,  will
likely  rise  by  a  smaller  amount.  Even  with  the  higher  level  of
crop  production,  a  level  that  may  be  fairly  near  total  capacity,
the  carryover  of grain  stocks  by  mid-1974  will  be  lower than  this
year's  (Table  1).  This  lower  expected  carryover  in  the  United
States  plus  a  similar  situation  for  other  major  grain  exporting
nations  leads  to  much  wonderment  about  the  future.  We  may
experience  continuing  increases  in  demand  for farm exports  next
year  if  world  production  does  not  recover  further.  On  the  other
hand,  we  could  see  a  substantial  drop  if world  grain  production
rises sharply or if livestock production  in central planned countries
is  cut  back.  Demand  will  almost  certainly  drop  if the  economic
boom  in  rapidly  developing  nations  cools  down  and  their  con-
sumers  back  away  from  eating  more  meat  and  protein  products.
TABLE  1. JULY  I  CARRYOVER  STOCKS  OF GRAIN
Wheat  Feed Grains
4
1971-72  1972-731  1973-742  1971-72  1972-731  1973-742
Million Metric  Tons
United States  23.5  11.5  8  68.1  59.5  56
Major  competitors
3 26.0  17.8  17  14.1  16.3  15
Total  49.5  29.4  25  82.2  75.8  71
Estimated on  August  10,  1973.  Projected  on August  10,  1973. 
3Canada,  Australia,  and
Argentina. 
4Corn,  oats,  barley,  and  rye.
The worldwide  agricultural production  situation in  1973 is, from
all  reports,  near  normal  with  no  major  unexpected  shortfalls  as
existed  in  1972.  Despite this fact,  so much  grain  will  be consumed
that  carryover  stocks  of grains  will  likely  be  reduced  further  by
next  year.  We  may  well  face  shortages  of fertilizer  and  fuels  in
1974.  All of these factors  will  affect  total crop production.
I  interpret  recent  events  this  way:  In  1972  we  increased
exports  by  using  up  grain  stocks.  In  1973-74  we  are  maintaining
those  exports  by  further  reducing  U.S.  stocks,  by  reducing  ship-
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With  only  20  million  acres  of reserve  capacity  left  to  return  to
production  (and  much  of that of doubtful  productivity),  it  seems
clear that we cannot expect further quantum jumps in farm exports.
If so,  the  prospects  for  using agricultural  exports  to  balance  our
trade  ledger are  much  more  limited  than we realized.
BALANCING  OUR TRADE POLICIES
Consider  our  experiences  of  the  past  year:  A  60  percent
increase  in  agricultural  exports,  a  50  percent  increase  in  farm
prices,  and a  15  percent  increase  in  retail food  prices.  These  pro-
vide  some  very  different  problems  and  hypotheses  for  analysts
to  grapple  with  in  the  next few  years.  There  is,  for  example,  no
clear-cut  measure  of  how  much  of our  large  increase  in  farm
exports  resulted  from  the  devaluation  of  the  dollar,  from  the
worldwide  economic  boom,  or  simply  from  unfavorable  weather
in  other  countries.  What  is  more,  no  ready  solutions  are  evident
for the  food  policy  problems  that  emerged  during  the  past  year.
The agricultural export situation demonstrates  at least one of these
problems.  It arises  as  follows.
For  several  decades,  in  the  United  States,  price-supported
grain  supplies  have  exceeded  effective  demand  with  well-known
results: stockpiling,  resource restrictions,  export subsidies, market
development  and domestic  distribution  programs.  These  policies
stabilized:  the  farm  sector  (though  some  would  argue  it  was
stabilized  in  a depressed  state),  the  food sector,  and the  real value
of rural  assets,  especially  those of agriculture.  As  long as  agricul-
ture faced  overproduction  and depressed  prices  and incomes,  the
federal government  had a relatively effective set of tools to manage
the  situation.
But  what  happened  when  agriculture  was  faced  with  excess
demand  and  rapidly  rising  prices?  We  did  not  have  a  similar  set
of policy tools to handle this situation.  We of the agricultural  estab-
lishment  had  not really  evaluated  such  possibilities.  Having faced
the  opposite  conditions  for  so  long,  we  assumed  that  any  period
of  excess  demand  would  be  temporary  with  reasonable  price
increases.  As  a  result,  no  permanent  policies  were  developed  to
handle the consequence  of quantum jumps  in  demand  and prices.
We  have  an  unbalanced  set  of  policies  that  deal  with  only  one
of two  problematic  situations.
The underlying  bias that agriculture  always tends toward over-
production  shows  up  in  many  places  including  the  1969  Report
to  the  President  on  Future  United  States  Foreign Trade  Policy.
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to obtain  acceptance  of the  principle  that  price  regulation  should
be aimed at price stabilization alone, and that import charges, other
than moderate  tariffs,  should  be limited in  their application."  The
report went on to outline how import restraints should be modified.
It did not  mention export  controls,  export embargoes,  wheat mar-
keting  board  restraints,  or  the  use  of export  taxes.  It  did  not,
in  fact,  mention  any  of the  many  ways  in  which  nations  in  1973
limited food exports to encourage  internal  price stability.  The limi-
tations  mentioned  were  those  used  to  restrict  the  expansion  of
agricultural  imports,  not  exports.  This  clearly  indicates  that  con-
tinued excess capacity  was expected.  In  1969, few analysts of trade
relationships  envisioned  any  need  even  to  discuss  restraints  on
agricultural exports.  Certainly, none foresaw the actual application
of export  restraints  in  1973.
We  have  all  kinds  of  programs  to  stabilize  agriculture  when
we  have  excess  supplies:  set-aside  programs,  price-support  pro-
grams,  reseal  programs,  demand  creation  programs,  and  import
limitation  programs.  We  have almost  no  policies  to  handle condi-
tions of excess  demand  beyond the sales of available  grain stocks
and the use of set-aside  acres.  Our policies are  one-sided  because
the historical perspective has convinced  us all that a more balanced
set of policies  is not  needed.
Perhaps  the  prospect  for  the  long  term  is  excess  supplies.
Nevertheless,  agricultural  economists  should  closely  scrutinize
events of the  past year.  The nation  pays dearly  for extreme  varia-
tions  in  food  prices  with  their  secondary  and  tertiary  impacts  on
wages  and,  ultimately,  industrial  prices.  The  past  year's  rises  in
food  costs,  lumber  costs,  and cotton  and  fiber costs  are  going  to
raise all living costs during the next few years and result in continu-
ing inflationary  pressures.
Balance  is just as essential  in food policy  as it is in wage  policy.
It  is just as  necessary  in  export  policy  as  it  is  in  industrial  price
guidelines.
In  the  trade  area,  policies  have  also  been  oriented  toward
excess  supply conditions.  We  have a whole  set of export  subsidy
programs.  Many kinds of assistance are available  to bolster export
sales  if demand  in  world markets  drops:  technical  advice  on  han-
dling sales to foreign buyers,  programs to introduce our food prod-
ucts to foreign  consumers,  low-cost  credit  programs to  encourage
sales,  and many other types of programs. We  also have a carryover
of legislative actions  that restrict imports  of various  goods.
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in  1972-73,  almost  no policy  responses are available  except those
with unacceptable  foreign  policy repercussions.  We need to think
through  and  outline  a  balanced  set  of  trade  policies:  to  handle
both familiar conditions of excess  supply and newly met conditions
of excess demand.  Public policy analysts have plenty of hard intel-
lectual work ahead  of them  in this area.
LONGER-TERM  TRENDS  IN  AGRICULTURAL  TRADE
For  years  the  major  objective  of U.S.  participation  in  trade
negotiations  has been  to expand  farm exports.  In  1972,  1973,  and
in  all  likelihood  1974,  we  have  expanded  farm  trade  beyond  our
most  optimistic  expectations.  Until  1972,  the  main  restraints  to
expanded farm exports  were the import policies of other countries.
In  1973,  our major restraint turned out to be our shrinking supplies.
Despite the optimism concerning  the short-run outcomes,  long-
range trends  in  agricultural  trade  are  posing  problems,  especially
in relationships  between developed  and developing countries. The
developed countries have many export options available to balance
their trade ledgers. The developing countries have far fewer export
alternatives because agriculture  and raw materials make up a major
share of their gross  national  products.  For these  nations  to  con-
tinue  developing,  they  must  import  industrial  goods.  For  these
nations  to  export,  there  has  to  be  a  demand  for  the  products  of
a labor-intensive,  primary  sectoral economy.
The trends  in world trade have  not favored  labor-intensive  en-
terprises  of the  developing  nations  in  the last  twenty years.  In  a
paper nearly two years ago Arthur Mackie used the data in Table 2
to  show  that the  market  share  of these  nations  in  both total  ex-
ports  and  agricultural  exports  is  declining.  While the  dollar  value
of developing  countries'  exports  has  increased,  the  real value  of
their  exports  has  been  fairly  constant.  It  is  almost  certain  that
the situation  has worsened  during  1973,  especially  for food-deficit
TABLE  2.  MARKET  SHARES  OF  WORLD  EXPORTS
Group of Export-  Total Exports  Agricultural  Exports
ing  Countries  1955  1960-64  1965-69  1955  1960-64  1965-69
Percent
Developed  65  68  70  45  52  55
Developing  25  20  19  45  37  34
Central  Plan  10  12  11  10  11  11
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100
SOURCE:  Iowa  State  University Center for Agricultural  and  Rural  Development,  U.S.
Trade Policy rand Agricultural Exports,  Iowa State  University  Press,  1973,  p.  70.
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ages  due  to  unfavorable  weather  and  growing  populations.  The
result  is  very  high  market  prices  at  the  same  time  that levels  of
concessional grain exports are being reduced. Where will this leave
these countries  in another decade  if present market conditions  for
food  continue?  This  issue  is  receiving  too  little  attention  from
foreign trade  analysts.  It seems  likely that the result will be either
a  further  drop  in consumption  levels  for the  poorest  of the  poor
in  these  nations,  or  a  growing  debt  burden  for  these  nations  in
future  years. Neither of these outcomes moves us toward the goal
of a reasonably  well adjusted  and  smoothly operating world  trade
system.
NEW  REALITIES IN AGRICULTURAL  TRADE
Events  of recent months  have  brought  something  new  to  our
attention.  In earlier times, discussions on agricultural trade largely
ignored  the  domestic  food  situation.  But  as  government  stocks
have  disappeared  and as exports  and  prices  of grain  and oilmeals
have soared,  it has become  much clearer that domestic and export
markets are more closely related than we acknowledged.  Prospects
for meat  production,  and  especially  pork  production,  have  gone
from  moderately  good  to poor to  bleak  in a period  of only a few
months.  Expanding  exports raised  grain prices  and despite  corre-
sponding rises in pork prices that generally  held the hog-corn  ratio
at levels  that used  to be conducive  to expanded  pork  production,
farmers  continued  to  sell  off breeding  stock.  This action  started
late  in  1972  and  continued  through  mid-1973.  With  farm  income
levels up and exceeding all-time records,  farmers  may not expand
total livestock  production in  the near future.
Given time, grain  and livestock  prices  will  assume  levels that
will lead producers  to supply  U.S.  consumers  with growing  quan-
tities of pork,  milk,  and eggs.  But it may  mean  that the structure
of agriculture  will change.  Pork  production  may become  concen-
trated in specialized  producing units  as more and  more grain pro-
ducers  follow the lead  of cash  grain farmers  in  Iowa and  Illinois,
and move away from livestock production.  Labor-intensive  enter-
prises like dairying, and even beef and pork production, may follow
vegetable production into Mexico and other lower wage countries.
Whatever  the  final  outcome,  it  seems  clear  that  the  strong
export demand of 1972-73,  if it continues,  is  going to  reverberate
on this nation's  agriculture for some  time.  It will have  an impact:
first  on  the value  of fixed farm  assets,  next  on  the cost  of living
and hence  on wage  rates,  and ultimately  on the prices of services
and industrial products.
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experienced  fluctuations  in  farm  prices  and  incomes  that  few  of
us ever imagined  could occur.  We have been faced with shortages,
soaring prices,  and unimaginable  public  clamor.  Perhaps  supplies
of grain  will expand  next year and provide some  measure  of insur-
ance  against  world  shortfalls.  But changed  world  monetary  rela-
tionships,  coupled  with  improved  consumer  purchasing  power  in
many nations, are going to keep our agricultural sector from return-
ing  to  pre-1972  conditions.  Farmers  may  well  experience  some
very  sharp cycles,  however,  if we  continue  to  have  policies  that
allow  prices  to  soar  so  far  above  support  levels.  Our  present
policies  deal  only with  the downside  of agricultural  price  trends,
and today  we are  far away  from that downside.
The time has  arrived for a new  assessment of the environment
surrounding  farm  prices,  income,  employment,  and  trade.  Some-
one  must examine  the world  implications  of energy  and  resource
shortages.  These  shortages  create  a  tendency  toward  overheat-
ing  economies  with  rising  consumer  incomes  and  inflationary
pressures  on  consumer  prices.  The  old  price,  income,  and  em-
ployment  theories  assumed  tendencies  toward  underutilization
of productive  capacity,  underemployment  of labor and  land,  and
long-term declines in real food and resource prices. The new reality
is  far  different,  and policies  and  programs  based  on old  assump-
tions are  ill  suited  for handling  the new  problems.  It  is,  in  short,
a time  of change.  It is  time  to  reexamine  our traditional  assump-
tions if we are to offer realistic advice  and assistance for the future.
The  task faced  by  our  representatives  to  the Nixon round  of
trade negotiations  is large and loosely defined.  So is the task facing
public  policy  analysts.  Sometimes  I  think  that  economic  intelli-
gence  also  takes one  step  backward  for each  two  steps  forward,
as Secretary  Shultz says of trade  negotiations.  Your job and mine
is  to  ensure  that economic  intelligence  does  not  take  two  steps
backward  for each step forward.
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